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Abstract 
Experiences with a number of field applications of system dynamics (SD) are detailed. While 
many of the benefits claimed by proponents of the paradigm were experienced, 
recommendations flowing from modelling exercises were not implemented in many cases. 
Moreover, simplistic prescriptions found in the SD literature (such as ensure key 
stakeholders are involved) were found to be impractical in various real-world situations. Our 
studies lead us to believe that a considerably more sophisticated approach to change 
management is required if organizations are to gain maximum benefit from their SD 
endeavours. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
System dynamics (SD) has been used to very good effect in many domains over recent years 
and, in particular, its application in software engineering process modelling has attracted a 
great deal of attention (see, especially, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1991). One particularly 
attractive feature of SD is its capacity to represent some aspects of the critical “people-
related”, organization behaviour issues so crucial to the successful implementation of any 
new business process or system. That is, most tools, in general, address the who, whom, what, 
where and when of process modelling, but not the how or the why. Specifically, they enable 
the recording of the details of the individuals and teams enacting a process, the artefacts 
produced and the sequencing of the functional tasks, but not the norms, beliefs, motives etc. 
of the staff carrying out the process: i.e. hard factors but not soft factors. 
Partly because of the above reasons, we have employed SD extensively in a number of 
business process modelling field studies over the past 5-6 years. In general, we have found 
our experiences with SD modelling (and a number of increasingly excellent software products 
based on the approach) to be rewarding. For the most part, however, any difficulties 
experienced in model development pale in comparison to problems we have experienced in 
having our recommendations implemented. This is our focus here, where we report on our 
experiences with four field studies; the first of which commenced in 1997 through to the 
fourth study, which is yet to be completed. 
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We employ a well-known change management framework (Leonard-Barton, 1988) to 
compare and contrast implementation characteristics of our studies. This analysis is presented 
in Section 3, following a brief presentation of each of our studies in Section 2. Concluding 
comments are presented in Section 4. A basic knowledge of SD and its modelling 
conventions is assumed. The reader requiring an introduction is referred to (Maani and 
Cavana, 2000). 
 
2. Case Studies 
The case studies described in this paper are taken from a collaborative research project that 
was undertaken with a large Australian information services provision company (which we 
shall refer to as Gigante). In all, the research was carried out over a 6-year period and began 
with a study into problems the company was experiencing at its customer interface. During 
this (rather lengthy) study, events occurred that gave rise to additional research opportunities 
and, while the scope of each of these overlapped the original investigation to a greater or 
lesser extent, each was treated as a separate study within the overall project. SD techniques 
were employed in all our work and we briefly outline four of our case studies in the following 
sub-sections. 
2.1 Case Study No. 1: Customer Service Interface Problems  
As noted, the catalyst for our series of case studies were problems that Gigante was 
experiencing in its customer interface operations. These problems were causing significant 
revenue losses, and previous investigations had indicated that the root causes were the high 
workload, plus a lack of training, combined with a high rate of new product introduction. In 
its attempts to remedy the situation, the company had poured much effort, resources and 
dollars into the development of a (flowchart-based) business process model. A simplified 
version of the relevant portion of that model is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Gigante’s information services provision function. 
Customers call a Customer Service Centre (CSC) and may request one or more information 
services. One Customer Service Representative (CSR) takes a customer’s order, comprised 
of one or more products (identified by product codes). The CSR then enters the order into the 
provisioning system. Because there are several hundred products, many errors occur at this 
point. Product codes entered into the provisioning system are translated into: 1) service codes 
and sent to the billing system; and 2) network reconfiguration data and sent to the engineers 
responsible for maintaining Gigante’s own internal network. In many cases where an 
incorrect product code is entered, the network will, nevertheless, be configured correctly. 
From this time, the customer has access to the requested services and may make calls. 
However, because of the incorrect service code in the billing system, call charge records 
(CCRs) will be rejected and a bill for the revenue involved cannot be issued until the original 
provisioning error is corrected. 
CSRs must correct their own errors but customer calls take priority. As the rejects database 
grows, the workload increases. This places more pressure on CSRs which, in turn, results in 
more errors and a vicious cycle is thus established. More errors, of course, also mean more 
customer enquiries and complaints, leading to a further workload increase. To cap it all off, 
Gigante releases new products on a regular basis. This places a further strain on CSRs - new 
products in themselves mean more errors but, with no time left for training (because of the 
workload), the situation is exacerbated. 
The development of an SD-based process model as a key component of our study was a 
worthwhile exercise and led to many of the benefits claimed by proponents of the modelling 
paradigm (see, e.g., Senge, 1990; and Vennix, 1996). In particular, the model (and, more 
specifically, the modelling process itself) greatly assisted us in familiarising ourselves with 
the study domain and seems to have ensured that all participants in the modelling process 
developed a common understanding of the key concepts. In turn, this deeper understanding of 
the inter-relatedness of the component parts of the total system resulted in a greater awareness 
of the flow-on effects of local decisions and actions to other areas of the organization. 
However, we experienced a number of difficulties with the approach. 
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Specifically, SD models do not readily decompose – they spread. This means that adding 
detail adds to the complexity of the model and inhibits validation and understanding. There is 
also a tendency for inexperienced modellers to “model the system” rather than the problem 
(Anderson, Richardson and Vennix, 1997). This, again, adversely affects validation and 
understanding, both of which are based on the model being useful for the purpose for which it 
was intended and require explicit identification of the problem boundary (Forrester 1961; 
Forrester and Senge, 1980; Legasto and Maciariello, 1980; Bell and Senge, 1980; Barlas, 
1996; Coyle and Exelby, 2000). SD models are also most effective when variables are 
aggregated to a very high level and analysis is restricted to determining/testing policies rather 
than operational questions (Forreste,r 1961). They are not suitable for capturing fine-grained 
detail. Our major problem with this exercise, however, was lack of implementation of 
recommendations. This problem is not unique to this particular modelling exercise, nor to the 
SD community (Campbell and McGrath, 1999). It is this issue that is the major concern of 
this paper. 
2.2 Case Study No. 2: A Pricing Policy Decision  
Gigante’s information services are provided via electronic voice and other 
telecommunications facilities. The organization’s policy has always been that, for connection 
times less than 5 seconds, the customer would not be charged. Gigante’s Accounting 
Department had analysed usage data and discovered that over 40% of calls fell into this 
category. Consequently, they proposed that the charging threshold be reduced to 2 seconds. 
Our client was concerned that this could lead to a substantial increase in billing enquiries and, 
thereby, lead to even more CSR errors. Making a number of simplifying assumptions, we 
were able to rapidly (within 2 days) develop an ithink model that demonstrated that the policy 
change could, indeed, lead to significant problems (which we were able to quantify as lost 
and delayed revenue estimates). This sufficiently concerned the organization that they 
decided not to proceed with the proposed pricing policy change. 
Figure 2. Causal loop model of reduced theshold impacts. 
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Key factors and relationships in the subsystem investigated are illustrated in the causal loop 
diagram presented in Figure 2. Essentially, a decrease in the charging threshold does indeed 
produce extra revenue but, at the same time, it also generates extra billing enquiries. This, in 
turn, creates extra work for CSRs and a consequent staff shortfall, meaning that extra staff 
resources are required (thus adding to costs). The staff shortfall also means that existing staff 
are put under more pressure, resulting in an increase in errors. Based on the situation in CSCs 
outlined earlier, some revenue involved in these errors will almost certainly be lost (or, at 
least, its collection will be substantially delayed). The staff shortfall also increases customer 
wait-time leading, eventually, to customer defections and more lost revenue. Note also that 
customer dissatisfaction over Gigante's inability to quickly resolve errors is another source of 
defections and that errors, in themselves, generate further enquiries (thus producing the 
pressure on CSR staff even further). Hence, the diagram illustrates that, while the proposed 
threshold reduction would clearly have produced extra revenue, there were several potential 
sources of reduced profit - specifically: increased CSR costs; additional unresolved errors (or 
delays in resolving errors); customer defections due to increased wait-time; and customer 
defections due to dissatisfaction with error resolution. 
Our causal loop model was translated into an ithink stock-flow model and simulations were 
run. These clearly demonstrated that profitability is extremely sensitive to the level of initial 
increase in enquiries: e.g. it was projected that a 10% initial increase would result in a net 
loss of $27.0M over 10 months. On the basis of this modelling and simulation exercise, the 
research team recommended that the proposed threshold decrease should not proceed until 
more was known. This recommendation was accepted by the company – in fact, while the 
report was still in draft form! This is in stark contrast to the previous case study, where much 
more effort was spent in modelling (and, from a technical viewpoint, a much superior model 
was produced) but very few of the research team’s recommendations were implemented. 
2.3 Case Study No. 3: An Outsourcing Initiative 
One of Gigante’s most successful areas was its International Division. Rapid response to new 
circumstances was the key to their success. In particular, communications lines were flexible 
and uncluttered and scant regard was paid to formal policies and procedures. Nowhere was 
this style of working more evident than in International’s IT operations. Rapid changes to 
production lines, the customer base and specific customer demands meant that billing, orders 
and customer management systems had to be updated frequently and quickly. Typically, a 
salesman working offshore would place an urgent call to the IT Manager and: 1) request 
information required to finalize a quote; and 2) advise of system changes required to support 
his prospective customer’s particular product demands. Unless the quote information was 
provided overnight and the necessary system changes made within a month (at the outside), it 
was highly likely that the deal would fall through. These sales support requests were given 
top priority by the IT Department, activities were carried out “on-the-fly” and, despite (or 
because of) its small size (12 people), the Department had compiled an excellent and 
admirable record in meeting its deadlines. As such, it was considered to be a major source of 
competitive advantage for International and was generally held in high regard by colleagues. 
This idyllic state of affairs came to an abrupt end in 1997 when Gigante entered into an 
outsourcing deal with Worldwide Information Technology (WIT). A major player in IT 
outsourcing, WIT had a hierarchical organization structure, a predominately bureaucratic 
mode of working and a culture similar in many respects to that of Gigante. In this 
environment, the very features that were the essence of International’s strengths and 
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successes now were jeopardized. In particular, to have any systems maintenance or 
enhancement work undertaken, work orders had to be prepared, and estimates and program 
specifications had to be developed. All these were then passed upwards through three layers 
of interface management on the Gigante side, then downwards through a similar number of 
layers on the WIT side and, finally, each work order had to be vetted by WIT’s Legal 
Department. 
Unconsulted prior to the establishment of the outsourcing arrangement or during the 
preparation of detailed operating procedures (which were far from complete in a number of 
important respects), International found itself in a very difficult position. With the procedures 
as they stood, there was no way that its sales force or other operations management and staff 
could continue to receive the level of IT service they had become accustomed to and required: 
its staff lacked both the skills and the will to prepare the necessary documentation and to 
negotiate their way through the system; unacceptable delays were intrinsic in the procedures 
themselves; and the final blow came when their champion (the General Manager) was 
promoted to an offshore position. 
In arguing their case, International’s IT Department felt that they needed some quantitative 
support. Intuitively, they were certain that outsourcing would have a major negative impact 
on their bottom line but needed some means of demonstrating this. We were consulted and it 
was agreed that, using SD, an ithink model would be developed and that we would employ its 
powerful simulation capabilities to demonstrate the impact that introducing delays into their 
processes would have. 
Having developed the model, we were then able to run various forms of sensitivity analysis. 
For example, Figure 3 illustrates the impact of variations in initial delays relative to 
competitors on market share (with graphs 1-5 corresponding to 4 weeks faster, 2 weeks faster, 
no difference, 2 weeks slower and 4 weeks slower respectively). A number of other graphs 
were produced as a result of our analyses and, collectively, these dramatically demonstrate 
the impact of both types of delay on International's market share and revenue: i.e. the 
modelling exercise produced precisely the type of "ammunition" the IT Department was 
seeking. 
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Figure 3: Delay impact on traffic share. 
However, the IT Department's attempts to utilise these results met with little success. In 
retrospect, there was always a fair chance this would eventuate, given that key decision-
makers were not included in the model building process (Vennix, 1996). Vennix's advice is 
sound and, in an ideal world, key stakeholders would always be involved in the development 
of important decision support models. The reality, though, is that, in many modelling 
situations, this is simply not possible. For example, in the case under review here, the size of 
the organization, stakeholders' other responsibilities, stakeholders' geographical dispersion 
and severe internal and external pressures on Gigante at the time of the study, all mitigated 
against our attempts to get "buy in" and active participation from the more influential 
decision makers. Moreover, even if we had managed to realize our desired levels of 
participation, we doubt it would have made a great deal of difference to the eventual 
outcome: i.e. other factors - notably power/political considerations were always going to 
make life very difficult for both International and, particularly, its IT Department. We turn 
our attention to these factors in the following section. 
2.4 Case Study No. 4: A Model of Software Procurement  
In this study, we ‘went over to the opposition’ – i.e. we worked with a team within Gigante’s 
outsourcing firm, WIT, in an effort to assist them to obtain a better understanding of their 
interface with their client and to abstract our findings into a more general model of the 
software procurement process (a very much under-researched area).  
Our study was concerned mainly with the IS operations of Gigante’s International 
Operations Division (GInt). Six software firms were contenders for a multi-million dollar 
ERP contract to be let by Gigante with one bidder, WIT, involving both its Sydney and 
Melbourne branches (to some extent, as competitors). The study covered a period from June 
1996 through to end-2000. As noted, in June 1996 Gigante outsourced all its internal IS 
development and operations work to WIT. GInt's systems had all been converted to run on a 
specific ERP product base during the early 1990s and these (100+) systems, together with the 
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40 ERP specialists responsible for their development and maintenance, were transposed to 
WIT as part of the outsourcing deal. 
Despite the (supposedly) exclusive nature of this deal however, GInt (in 1999) went out to 
tender for a complete upgrade of its ERP systems. Eventually, WIT were successful but felt 
that they did not understand the software procurement process sufficiently well. As a result, 
we were asked to generalise from this case study to a model that might be employed for 
decision support and training purposes.  
Figure 4: An episodic/encounter model example. 
In a particularly interesting piece of work focussed on COTS, Heiskanen, Newman and 
Simila (2000) present a ‘social model of software development’ based on user-developer 
interaction. This interaction is defined as relatively stable “state progress passages” over 
periods of time (episodes) punctuated by “critical events” (encounters). Encounters have the 
potential to radically change various attributes of user-developer interaction; such as 
developer access to users, influence and user satisfaction with developer performance. 
Longitudinal representations of interactions are portrayed in diagrams similar to Figure 4. In 
this example, the user organization is initially equivocal about its new system. Then, at 
encounter No.1, something happens (e.g. a major disagreement over project direction) that 
causes users to reject the system. Later, at encounter No.2, rejection changes to acceptance 
(because e.g. the initial version is released and users are very happy with it). At encounter 
No.3, the user organization again rejects the system (due e.g. to a sharp increase in leasing 
and maintenance fees). 
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These diagrams are very useful but key features of the episodic/encounter model seem to be 
eminently well-suited to an SD representation. In particular, the ability of SD modelling tools 
capture the complex feedback loops intrinsic to software processes and to automatically 
simulate system behaviour over time may be used to good effect. In addition, more subtle 
aspects of the vendor-client relationship can be neatly modelled, simulated and illustrated. 
Here, there is already a substantial and rapidly-expanding body of work dealing with the use 
of SD for (in-house) software engineering process modelling; the seminal work in this field 
being that of Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991). 
Figure 5: A model of software procurement. 
The initial version of our software procurement model is presented in Figure 5. The model is 
underpinned by two theories from the management science literature; expectancy theory and 
the ‘garbage can’ model of organizational decision making. Expectancy theory (DuBrin, 
1995) is actually a group of motivation theories founded on a rational-economic view of 
people but all versions are based on: i) the expectation that an act will result in a given 
outcome; and ii) the attractiveness of that outcome to the party. Effort is linked to 
performance and performance, in turn, is linked to rewards. If a breakdown occurs at any 
point in the chain then, ultimately, less effort will be put in (i.e. motivation will suffer). These 
linkages and loops are clearly evident in our model presented in Figure 5. Specifically: i) a 
vendor puts effort into managing a client relationship (which costs money); ii) the effort 
expended is a major determinant of the level of access (LOA) that the vendor has to the client 
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(performance); and iii) the level of access, in turn, will have an impact on the amount of work 
the vendor secures from the client (rewards). If, however, the vendor puts a lot of effort into 
the relationship and this does not bear fruit (in both improved access to the client and more 
work), then he or she is liable to be demotivated1. Finally, in our base model, the user 
(playing the role of the vendor) has the opportunity to vary the effort put into maintaining the 
relationship at different points during a simulation run. The temptation to do this may be 
considerable because relationship management is expensive and consequences (reduced level 
of access and less work) may not become evident for some time. 
The parameters of our base model have been established such that vendor effort will, indeed, 
deteriorate gradually over time – behaviour quite consistent with the poor customer 
relationship management characteristic of much COTS implementation and maintenance 
(Heiskanen et al., 2000). Obviously, if this continues for long enough without major 
intervention (or encounters, using the terminology of Heiskanen et al., 2000), then the vendor 
is liable to be at a major disadvantage if (for example) the opportunity to bid for a major new 
contract arises. As noted, our client’s intention was to employ our model as a training tool 
and decision making aid. To date though, this has not occurred to any great extent. 
3. Comparison and Discussion 
While there is a growing body of literature in the change management field, it is deficient in a 
number of ways including: a failure to differentiate between initiating change and 
successfully implementing such change (Watkins, Ellinger and Valentine, 1999); a real 
understanding of how change is well introduced and implemented (Buchanan and Badham, 
1999); and neither has there been adequate addressing of the variable dimensions of depth, 
size, pervasiveness of change and the diverse perspectives from which such change is viewed 
and managed (Bolman and Deal, 1997; Wing, 2001). What is reflected in our case studies and 
gradually being emphasised in the literature is the need to address innovation and paradigm 
shifts (Chakravarthy, 1997) and to actually track as we have endeavoured to do, actual 
longitudinal, organizational case studies.  
Given such confusion in the research and literature the well-tried Leonard-Barton (1988) 
change model is an appropriate change management tool; not only because of its clarity, but 
also because of its focus on change management in high-technology organizations. While her 
framework is by no means complete, over recent years we have found it to be an excellent 
starting point for assessing the probability of success of proposed organizational innovations. 
Here, we employ the framework to retrospectively contrast and compare the four SD case 
studies detailed in the previous section. 
The basis of Leonard-Barton’s model is that: i) any technologically-based change initiative 
has implementation characteristics; and ii) that these characteristics set conditions within 
which change managers must operate and, in turn, dictate implementation tactics. The 
principal characteristics are: 
· Transferability, which includes: 
o Preparedness, the extent to which the technology has been proven; and 
                                                 
1 This behaviour is built into the feedback loops from Work and LOA to Effort. 
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o Communicability, the extent to which the technology’s features can be communicated 
to end-users and decision makers. 
· Implementation complexity, which includes: 
o Organizational span, the number of people affected by the innovation; and 
o Organizational scope, the number of organization units affected. 
· Divisibility, which includes the degree to which the innovation implementation can be 
partitioned according to: 
o  Modularization (i.e. partition the innovation itself); and 
o Individualization, meaning implement the total innovation in one part of the 
organization at a time. 
Table 1 compares and contrasts the four case studies according to the Leonard-Barton 
framework. While the retrospective analysis of our case studies suggests that the predictive 
capability of the framework is reasonably sound. It is our view, however, that its real value 
lies in its capacity to highlight areas of the implementation domain that require special 
attention in change management planning. Here, Case Study 3 provides an excellent 
illustrative example and we now revisit this study. 
 
 Case Studies 
 1 2 3 4 
Transferability:     
  Preparedness Low High Low Low 
  Communicability Low High Low Low 
Complexity:     
  Org. span High Low Low Medium 
  Org. scope High Low Low Medium 
Divisibility:     
  Modularization Medium N/A High High 
  Individualization Low N/A High High 
     
Chances for success Low High Good Medium 
Table1: Case Study prospects for success according to the Leonard-Barton framework. 
Gigante's International Division (and, particularly, its IT Department) could clearly see the 
devastation the outsourcing decision would wreak on their business. In their attempts to 
alleviate the impact of this decision, they employed rational arguments. However, much 
decision making in organizations is not rational. In this instance, International's concerns 
were dwarfed by a much bigger ‘game’ and, here, their lack of any real political clout counted 
very much against them. In the causal-loop diagram presented in Figure 6, we have attempted 
to represent some of the major influences we detected as part of this wider game. 
Organizations enter into IT outsourcing agreements for many reasons. During this study, we 
heard considerable conjecture as to the real reasons behind the Gigante/WIT deal, but press 
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reports at the time consistently nominated major cost savings as Gigante's principal motive 
for entering into the contract (one of the largest IT contracts ever signed by an Australian 
company). 
A special Program Management team (abbreviated as pm in Figure 6) was formed to manage 
Gigante's side of the alliance. From Figure 6, it can be seen that their performance had a 
major effect on the success of the outsourcing venture. Furthermore, since most of Gigante's 
products require substantial IT support, outsourcing operations had a significant impact on 
product performance and this, in turn, directly influenced Gigante's bottom line. In addition, 
the direct link from outsourcing perf to  Gigante profit indicates that outsourcing, in itself, 
was expected to contribute to profit through greatly decreased IT costs. Thus, this portion of 
the diagram effectively mirrors Gigante's official outsourcing policy and views. 
Figure 6. Impact of allowing outsourcing exceptions. 
However, other important factors were also at work. In particular, Gigante's executive, the 
Project Management team and the outsourcing agent (WIT) all stood to gain (and lose) much 
from the outsourcing venture and links from Project Management team and agent 
performance to rewards/profit are clearly identified in Figure 6. In this context, it is easy to 
see that exceptions (exemptions from the outsourcing arrangement) could clearly not be 
tolerated. That is, apart from reducing the agent's profit, every exception allowed was likely 
to have a damaging impact on general perceptions of Project Management team performance. 
Thus, Project Management implemented a policy to the effect that exceptions would not be 
allowed under any circumstance - no matter what benefits specific cases might have for 
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individual products (and the systems and personnel that supported these). To complete the 
picture, outsourcing can be a very risky business (Aubert et al., 2001) and there were many 
(inside and outside Gigante) who doubted the wisdom of this particular venture. 
Consequently, perceptions of the performance of Gigante's executive were closely linked to 
both the outsourcing operations themselves and the Project Management team. 
Looked at in a (seemingly) rational light, the decision not to exempt International and their 
systems from the outsourcing deal seems bizarre - ensuring as it did the eventual destruction 
of International's leadership in their particular product market, plus the additional loss of a 
number of committed, scarce and valued IT specialists. If we view the situation from a 
power/political perspective, though, the events that transpired begin to make sense. In 
particular, Pfeffer (1981; 97-135) presents a classification scheme for power sources. Using 
this scheme, we may investigate the impact of a decision to allow outsourcing exceptions on 
the power sources of the three parties discussed earlier in this section. 
Clearly, all parties stood to lose substantially. The Project Management team and the agent 
would have lost (shared) control over the provision of important resources (International’s 
systems and IT personnel) to the organization at large and, in addition, the agent would have 
received less funds for its services. Furthermore, without control over these systems and 
specialist personnel, the two parties' total level of expert knowledge (a vital source of power 
in organizations) would have suffered. Gigante's executive, however, would have been 
largely unaffected (in a direct sense) with respect to these power sources. 
Perhaps, most interesting of all is that reputations are built upon perceptions Pfeffer (1981; 
54-57) and all parties would have suffered here. As noted previously, allowing exceptions 
would have had a major negative impact on perceptions of Project Team performance. Actual 
performance also has an effect on perceived pm perf and both these factors are clearly 
identified in our causal-loop diagram. The link between perceptions of Project team and 
Gigante's executive performance is also identified. However, in Pfeffer's scheme, there is also 
a clear link from perceptions (of both power and performance) to prestige and extending our 
model to specify this additional relationship is a relatively simple exercise. Finally, where an 
organization unit or group has a strong, united, common view on issues, they derive power 
from consensus (Pfeffer, 1981; 122-124). Pfeffer emphasises that this is a particularly 
formidable power source but one that can easily be dissipated by significant change. 
Allowing exceptions would certainly fit into this category. 
4. Conclusion 
The experiences described in this paper with four SD modelling exercises would appear to 
indicate that implementation outcomes are not determined by the amount of effort expended 
in modelling. Nor are they dependent on the validity, or accuracy, of models. Rather, they 
appear to be more dependent on the effectiveness of change management approaches adopted. 
We believe, Case Study 3 was particularly instructive. Organization change increases the turf 
warfare of change management - and part of this includes the more macro dimensions of 
organization prestige and reputation. In the realm of any organization’s corporate 
communication, the most critical function is that of the organization’s image and identity, 
important within the organization but perhaps even more vital to the external community and 
many of its key stakeholders. Diverse stakeholders may have varying images of an 
organization but reputation and identity should be consistent, a hallmark that distinguishes it 
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instantly in a globally competitive environment where attracting the right customers, 
investors and employees is crucial. Image, identity, prestige and reputation are today 
hallmarks of the qualitative intangibles based in perceptions and hard fought for. They are 
part of an organization’s intellectual capital in the broad sense and can be irrevocably 
damaged even by one instance of poor management. Put simply, the organization is the 
message and poor communication (arising, for example, from the politically-motivated turf 
warfare referred to above) can destroy it instantly! 
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